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1IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH, :
Plaintiff/Appellee, :
v. :
LARRY LEWIS HUTCHINGS, : Case No. 20080681-CA
Defendant/Appellant. :
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 77-
18a-1(1)(a) (2006 as amended) and 78-4-103(2)(e) (2008 as amended).  
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Did defense counsel and the prosecution have an improper relationship or
did they conspire to deprive Mr. Hutchings of his due process rights?  Questions of law
are reviewed for correctness.  State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992).  The
issue was preserved in Mr. Hutchings’ pro se “Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Amend Appellants Brief,” see Addendum A.  The issue is not otherwise contained in the
record.
2. Was the evidence insufficient to support a conviction?  “We will not
overturn a jury verdict unless the evidence presented at trial is “so insufficient that
reasonable minds could not have reached the verdict.”  J.W. v. State, 2001 UT App 208
2(citations omitted).  Similarly, did the court err in not granting Mr. Hutchings’ motion to
dismiss?  “[A] motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the state's case may be
denied if the trial court finds that the state has established a ‘prima facie case against the
defendant by producing 'believable evidence of all the elements of the crime charged.'’ 
State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 1992) (citation omitted).  The evidence is to be
viewed in the light most favorable to the state.  See Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, ¶ 16,
990 P.2d 933.  The issue was preserved at trial.  R 271:75-80.
3. Did “vindictive prosecution” occur when the State amended the Information
to alleged more serious crimes than the ones listed in the original information?  Questions
of law are reviewed for correctness.  State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992). 
The issue was preserved in Mr. Hutchings’ pro se “Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Amend Appellants Brief,” see Addendum A.  Mr. Hutchings response to counsel’s
characterization of this related issue is attached in Addendum B.
4. Did the trial court err in denying Mr. Hutchings’ Motion for a New Trial on
the basis that prior trial counsel failed to investigate and raise the circumstances of his
back injury to the jury?  “[I]t is well settled that, as a general matter, the trial court has
broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for a new trial.  Under this standard of review,
we will reverse only if there is no reasonable basis for the decision.”  State v. Redding,
172 P.3d 319, 2007 UT App 350 (citations omitted).  The issue was preserved in Mr.
Hutchings’ Motion for a New Trial.  R. 269.
35. Did prior trial counsel perform ineffectively when he failed to object to an
improper jury instruction.  "This court reviews a trial court's failure to give accurate
elements in a jury instruction under a correctness standard."  State v. Stevenson, 884 P.2d
1287, 1290 (Utah App. 1994).  "This court has consistently held that '[f]ailure to give an
elements instruction for a crime satisfies the manifest injustice standard under rule 19(c)
and constitutes reversible error as a matter of law.'"  American Fork v. Carr, 970 P.2d
717, 720 (Utah App. 1998) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).  "Further, because
[t]he general rule is that an accurate instruction upon the basic elements of an offense is
essential, failure to provide such an instruction is reversible error that can never be
considered harmless."  State v. Stringham, 957 P.2d 602, 608 (Utah App. 1998)
(alteration in original) (quotations and citations omitted); see also State v. Jones, 823 P.2d
1059, 1061 (Utah 1991) ("[T]he failure to give [an elements] instruction can never be
harmless error.").  
Prior defense counsel did not object to the jury instruction.  "When objections are
not made at trial and properly preserved, appellate review is under a 'plain error' standard. 
Plain errors are those that 'should have been obvious to the trial court and that affect the
substantial rights of the accused.'"  State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1210-11 (Utah App.
1991) (citing State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 29, 35 (Utah), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 814
(1989)); cf. State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992) (Challenges to jury
instructions ordinarily present a question of law, reviewed on appeal without deference to
4the trial court).  For unpreserved issues, the matter may be reviewed under the doctrines
of plain error, manifest injustice, or ineffective assistance of counsel.  State v. Morgan,
813 P.2d 1207, 1210-11 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Casey, 2003 UT 55 at ¶ 40, 82 P.3d
1106 ("'[M]anifest injustice' has been defined as being 'synonymous with the "plain error"
standard.'"); see also Casey, 2003 UT 55 at ¶ 41 (The manifest injustice or the plain error
standard requires the appellant to show that "'(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should
have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error,
there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant, or phrased
differently, our confidence in the verdict is undermined.'"). 
“To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, ‘a defendant must show (1) that
counsel's performance was so deficient as to fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness and (2) that but for counsel's deficient performance there is a reasonable
probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.’"  Mvers v. State,
2004 UT 31, ¶ 20, 94 P.3d 211.  
In addition, “When an ineffective assistance of counsel claim ‘is raised for the first
time on appeal without a prior evidentiary hearing, it presents a question of law.’”  State
v. Isiah Bo'Cage Vos, 2007 Ut App 215, ¶9 (Utah App 2007) (citations omitted).  
5STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The texts of the following relevant constitutional and statutory provisions are
contained in this brief or Addendum C:
1. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in
Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (1)(a),
uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601or other means or
force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury.
Id. (emphasis added).
2. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(11) (“serious bodily injury” includes “bodily injury
that creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of
the function of any bodily member”). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On April 13, 2006, the State filed an Information charging Mr. Hutchings with
one count of Burglary, a Second Degree Felony; one count of Assault (Domestic
Violence), a Class A Misdemeanor; and one count of Criminal Mischief, a Class B
Misdemeanor.  R. 1-3.  
After Mr. Hutching’s Preliminary Hearing on June 13, 2006, the State filed an
Amended Information charging Mr. Hutchings with one count of Aggravated Burglary, a
6First Degree Felony; one count of Aggravated Assault, a Second Degree Felony; and one
count of Criminal Mischief, a Class B Misdemeanor.  R. 4-5.
Following the trial, the jury found Mr. Hutchings guilty of Criminal Mischief and
Aggravated Assault.  R. 212-213.  Mr. Hutchings was found not guilty of Aggravated
Burglary.  R. 214  
On October 22, 2007, the trial court sentenced Mr. Hutchings “to an indeterminate
term of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison” on
Count II, Aggravated Assault, a 2  degree felony.  R. 229.  Mr. Hutchings was “givennd
credit for time serve[d]” on Count III, Criminal Mischief.  R. 230.  The trial court ordered
that Mr. Hutching’s sentence to “run consecutively to time now serving at Utah State
Prison.”  R. 230 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On April 6, 2006, Larry Hutchings went to 120 E. Utopia Avenue, #2, a place
where he resided.  R 271:106.  His girlfriend, Deborah Cuddeback, would not open the
door.  R 271: 113.  Mr. Hutchings kicked in the door to retrieve some of his personal
belongings whereupon he was attacked by Ms. Cuddeback.  R 271: 113-14.  According to
the State, however, Mr. Hutchings was the aggressor who grabbed the victim and
assaulted her.  During the altercation, Ms. Cuddeback scratched and bruised Mr.
Hutchings about the neck and face.  R 271: 115-17, 120.  Ms. Cuddeback’s hand was
broken; she had discomfort in her neck and other parts of her body.  R 271:42, 47.  
7Not finding proof of all the elements of Aggravated Burglary, the jury found Mr.
Hutchings not guilty of “intentionally or knowingly ... enter[ing] or remain[ing]
unlawfully in the dwelling [of] Deborah Cuddeback ... [w]ith the intent to commit an
assault on any person; and ... [t]hat in attempting, committing, or fleeing from a burglary,
the defendant caused bodily injury to Deborah Cuddeback, who was not a participant in
the crime.”  R 181 (the elements of Aggravated Burglary are contained in Instruction 7). 
His acquittal on that charge, though, was offset by his convictions for Aggravated Assault
and Criminal Mischief, from which he appeals. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Clayton, 639
P.2d 168 (Utah 1981), appellate counsel for Mr. Hutchings hereby files a hybrid "Anders"
brief.  Point I and its subsections are raised pursuant to Anders.  Point II is raised
separately by appellate counsel without any reference to Anders.
No evidence exists in the record in terms of any improper attempts between the
prosecution and defense counsel to conspire against Mr. Hutchings.  The record speaks
for itself as to the actions or inactions taken by defense counsel during trial and on appeal. 
Sufficient evidence existed in the record to establish “serious bodily injury.”  Mr.
Hutchings disagrees with that assessment and appears to argue that the lack of distinction
between “serious bodily injury” and “substantial bodily injury” entitles him to the benefit
of a lesser charge.
8Mr. Hutchings argues that the mental state of “intentionally” was not proven at
trial. Counsel expounds on that issue and notes that because the jury was allowed to base
its Aggravated Assault conviction on the lesser mental state of “knowingly,” the
conviction must be reversed due to the improper elements instruction.  Assuming,
arguendo, that sufficient evidence existed for the  “intentionally” or “knowingly” mental
state, given the possibility that the jury used an inapplicable mental state in accordance
with the flawed instruction, defense counsel performed ineffectively in allowing such an
instruction to be given to the jury.  The trial court also erred in allowed such an
instruction since it was contrary to the plain language of the Aggravated Assault statute.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.  ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL MAY BE BRIEFED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE ANDERS AUTHORITY
In Point I, Mr. Hutchings’ issues are summarized below.  His own pro se position
is attached in Addendum A and Addendum B. 
A. DID DEFENSE COUNSEL AND THE PROSECUTION HAVE AN
IMPROPER RELATIONSHIP OR DID THEY CONSPIRE TO DEPRIVE
MR. HUTCHINGS OF HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS? 
According to Mr. Hutchings, one of his arguments appears to suggest that his trial
counsel and/or his appellate counsel are not appropriately representing him:
The defendant’s attorneys Jason Poppleton and Lisa Remal[,] as members of the
Salt Lake Legal Defenders Association [and] also [as] a state agency[,] have a
close and continuous relations[hip] with the prosecuting office and the court itself
through discrete, ami[a]ble relationships with the judge, through the court family. 
In defendant's case it appears that his defense counsel was careful not to
       In addition to the arguments briefed on appeal, Mr. Hutchings previously requested1
and this Court denied his Rule 23B motion to remand the case for an ineffective of
assistance of counsel determination.  Utah R. App. P. 23B.
9
compromise or weaken the[ir] relationship by any seemingly antagonistic action in
defense of the defendant.  A definite at[titude] of "Go and get along" will be
shown as to [be] defense counsel's approach in defendant's defense.  The same
appears to be the approach of appellant counsel, Ron Fujino, in this appeal.
See State of Utah v. Larry Lewis Hutchings, "Memorandum in Support of Motion to
Amend Appellant's Brief," page 2, dated January 21, 2009 (hereinafter Hutchings’ Issues)
(attached as Addendum A).
In contrast to Mr. Hutchings' claims, however, no evidence exists in the record
regarding any improper relationship between the prosecution and defense counsel.  The
record speaks for itself as to the actions or inactions taken by defense counsel during trial
and on appeal.  Other than the arguments made herein,  there is no record basis for such1
an argument on appeal.  Cf. Utah R. App. P. 11(e)(2) ("Transcript required of all evidence
regarding challenged finding or conclusion.  If the appellant intends to urge on appeal that
a finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant
shall include in the record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or
conclusion."); see also Carter v. Galetka, 44 P.3d 626, 2001 UT 96 ("Counsel cannot be
found ineffective for failing to raise an ineffectiveness of counsel issue against himself or
herself.").
10
B. DID THE PROSECUTION FAIL TO MEET ITS BURDEN OF PROOF IN
NOT PRESENTING SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT A
CONVICTION? 
While it may be understandable that Mr. Hutchings disagrees with the jury’s
verdict or its perception of the persuasiveness of the trial evidence, the standard of review
on appeal means that the trial evidence may not be simply reargued to this Court as if it
were another jury:
This court has stated that in order to prevail on a sufficiency challenge to a jury
verdict, “the one challenging the verdict must marshal the evidence in support of
the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in
the light most favorable to the verdict.”  We will not overturn a jury verdict unless
the evidence presented at trial is “so insufficient that reasonable minds could not
have reached the verdict.” 
The burden on a defendant challenging the sufficiency of the evidence is heavy.
Defendant must marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's findings
of fact and then demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences
drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support the findings against an attack.  This
court ‘must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of
the evidence [presented at trial], or if [we] otherwise reach[] a definite and firm
conviction that a mistake has been made.’  The conviction, however, ‘must be
supported by a quantum of evidence concerning each element of the crime as
charged from which the [factfinder] may base its conclusion of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.’ 
J.W. v. State, 2001 UT App 208 (citations omitted).
1. A Quantum Of Evidence Existed For Serious Bodily Injury 
According to Mr. Hutchings, “the prosecution has never at any time produced
evidence of a serious bodily injury having been caused to another by anyone[,] let alone
the defendant.”  Hutchings’ Issues, page 9.  The aggravated assault jury instruction and
       Mr. Hutchings also appears to argue that because subparagraph (b) requires “force2
likely to produce death or serious bodily injury,” he was improperly convicted.  Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(b) (emphasis added).  Assuming the correctness of his
statement that that there was no force likely to produce death in this case, there still was
force likely to produce serious bodily injury – force a step below the jury finding that he
actually caused serious bodily injury to another.  Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(a). 
Again, the issue is a non-issue because the subparagraph (b) language was not presented
to the jury in the instruction.  R 186.
11
the corresponding statute both require proof of “serious bodily injury.”  R 186 (Jury
Instruction 14 is attached as Addendum D); Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(a); Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(b) (subsection (b) of the aggravated assault statute is inapplicable
because it was not part of the instruction given to the jury).  2
“A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in Section
76-5-102 and he ... intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another.”  Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-103. Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(11), “serious bodily injury” includes
“bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, protracted loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily member.”  Id.  As reflected by the following
excerpted portions of the trial transcripts, for the element of serious bodily injury a
quantum of evidence existed from which the jury may base its conclusion of guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.  Ms. Cuddeback expressly testified about sustaining protracted loss or
impairment of the function of her hand:
Ms Cuddeback: That’s as far as I can bend my hand still.  
. . . . . 
12
Ms. Parkinson: What type of work do you do?  I know you don’t want to say
where you work, but what type of work do you do?
Ms. Cuddeback: Housekeeping.
Ms. Parkinson: So do you use your hand a lot then?
Ms. Cuddeback: I do.
Ms. Parkinson: Has it been difficult to use your hand?
Ms. Cuddeback: Very.
Ms. Parkinson: How so?
Ms. Cuddeback: I clean millions of toilets.  And I use a rag, and it has all these
metal works on the back.  And you have to wipe in here and
there.  And I hit it on the thing all the time.  And just pushing
the bathroom cart that we push from place to place, you have
to squeeze it and push the thing along.  It gets very sore after
a while.
Ms. Parkinson: Are you right handed?
Ms. Cuddeback: I am very much right handed.
Ms. Parkinson: Has this injury effected the way you write?
Ms. Cuddeback: Oh, yeah, big time.
Ms. Parkinson: Your Honor, if we could have the witness step down and
show the jury her injuries?
The Court: Any objection?
Mr. Poppleton: No objection.
The Court: If there is no objection from the defense, that’s fine.
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Ms. Parkinson: If you could just show the jury how you can move your hand,
or if you can’t move your hand and where your knuckle is.
Ms. Cuddeback: I can only bend it right here.
Ms. Parkinson: So could you show us the other hand where the knuckle
should be aligned?  And let’s see your other hand.  So can you
actually close your fist?
Ms. Cuddeback: I could, but just this far.
See R. 272:61; R. 272:65-67.  In addition to Ms. Cuddeback’s testimony, Dr. Steven
Mimnaugh’s testimony provided more evidence of serious bodily injury:
Mr. Burmester: Even without the further specialist, you mention a certain
amount of time that the bone would have to be immobilized. 
Assuming it all welded back miraculously perfect, how long
would that take?
Dr. Mimnaugh: It would probably take – six weeks would be a good guess of
constant immobilization.  There are implications to the
immobilization because then the muscles get weak and
tendons can shorten and joints can get stiff.  And so then
there’s – usually will have the patients do a course of hand
therapy to make sure that the hand goes back to its normal
function.  
Mr. Burmester: While it’s immobilized or after?
Dr. Mimnaugh: After.  After.  So you are sure the bone is really set up.
Mr. Burmester: So the setup time takes how long?
Dr. Mimnaugh: About six weeks.
Mr. Burmester: And then assuming that is successful, a time of physical
therapy for how long would you guess?
Dr. Mimnaugh: Probably four weeks.
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R. 271:53-54.  Sufficient evidence was presented for proving “serious bodily injury.” 
2. The Evidence Presented At Trial Satisfied The Intent Requirement of 
“Knowingly”
According to Mr. Hutchings, “the prosecution failed to ever present any evidence
[of] intent, [specifically] as to the specific element[,] intentionally.”  Hutchings’ Issues,
page 9.  However, as discussed below, the more glaring problem was that the jury was
improperly allowed to base its conviction on the lesser mental state of “knowingly.”  See
infra Point II; R 198 (in jury instruction 27, the mental states of “intentionally” AND
“knowingly” were both presented to the jury); R 271: 178 (during closing argument, the
prosecution addressed the “knowingly” element of aggravated assault).
Assuming, arguendo, that the “intentionally” or “knowingly” mental state may
have been satisfied by the evidence presented at trial, there is no way for this Court to
know which mental state the jury relied on during its deliberations.  Since the jury may
have based its conviction on the “knowingly” mental state, see R 186 (jury instruction 14)
and R 198 (jury instruction 27), the trial court improperly allowed them to consider a
mental state below the greater mental state of “intentionally” in reaching its verdict.  
The jury was not properly informed about the difference between “knowingly” and
“intentionally.”  Such a result constitutes prejudicial error and requires reversal.  State v.
Haston, 846 P.2d 1276, 1277 (Utah 1993) (per curiam) (“Since the jury was allowed to
consider the depraved indifference alternative, as well as those states of mind described in
subsections (a) and (b) of section 76-5-203(1), defendant is entitled to a new trial.”); see
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Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 322 (1985) ("Nothing in these specific sentences or in
the charge as a whole makes clear to the jury that one of these contradictory instructions
carries more weight than the other.  Language that merely contradicts and does not
explain a constitutionally infirm instruction will not suffice to absolve the infirmity.  A
reviewing court has no way of knowing which of the two irreconcilable instructions the
jurors applied in reaching their verdict."); see infra Point II.
C. DID “VINDICTIVE PROSECUTION” OCCUR WHEN THE STATE
AMENDED THE INFORMATION TO ALLEGED MORE SERIOUS
CRIMES THAN THE ONES LISTED IN THE ORIGINAL
INFORMATION?
According to Mr. Hutchings, the prosecution’s decision to amend the charges
listed in the Information amounted to vindictive prosecution.  After the preliminary
hearing, the State asserted its position:
And your Honor, the State would rest at this point.  The State has informed
defense Counsel that the offer is withdrawn once the preliminary hearing went
forward.
The State also told defense Counsel that we would be amending the Information 
to an aggravated burglary, Count I, instead of burglary now as a second-degree
felony; and the second count would be an aggravated assault, as a second-degree,
causing serious bodily injury.  Defense Counsel was aware of that.
R. 31:30.  The court allowed the amendment and bound-over the charges.  R. 31:31.
“The court may permit an indictment or information to be amended at any time
before verdict if no additional or different offense is charged and the substantial rights of
the defendant are not prejudiced.”  Utah R. Crim P. 4(d).  Mr. Hutchings correctly views
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the State’s amendment as improper because a “different offense is charged.”  Id. 
However, the second part of Rule 4 hinders his argument.
Tillman v. Cook, 855 P.2d 211 (Utah, 1993), provides guidance.  Defendant
Tillman also argued that his substantial rights were prejudiced by an amendment to the
information.  Rejecting his argument, the supreme court explained the “[h]e was bound
over after the information was amended; therefore, the circuit court found probable cause
in the evidence to support it.  Moreover, the information was amended on August 18,
1982, and the trial did not begin until January 4, 1983.  Thus, Tillman's attorneys had
more than three months after the amendment to prepare a defense to the additional
aggravating circumstances alleged.  Id. at 215-16.
Similarly, in Mr. Hutchings’ case, he was bound over after the information was
amended, with probable cause found by the circuit court.  Since Mr. Hutchings’ trial then
did not commence until September 4, 2007 – approximately 15 months after the
preliminary hearing, his notice of the amendment and the opportunity to defend the
aggravated assault charges were at least as great as the 3 month time period afforded
Tillman to defend in his death penalty case.  See also State v. Kirgan, 712 P.2d 240
(1985) (citation omitted) (“A variance between an information and the proof will be
considered immaterial in a case in which it appears that the defendant's right to notice and
fair opportunity to defend have not been infringed and the record is such as to protect the
defendant against another prosecution for the same offense.”).  
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Due to governing authority, which allowed the State to amend the Information
after the preliminary hearing, the lack of improper action by the State nullifies the
vindictive prosecution argument.
D. DID TRIAL COUNSEL PERFORM INEFFECTIVELY WHEN IT
FAILED TO INVESTIGATE THE DEFENDANT’S BACK INJURY?
According to Mr. Hutchings, his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to
investigate his back injury and to present evidence of his injury to the attention of the
jury.  The parties disagreed on the nature of the struggle which formed the basis for the
aggravated assault charge.  Mr. Hutchings’ position is that had the jury known about his
back injury, his account would have been believed over the victim’s account because his
back injury prevented him from acting (or assaulting) anyone in the manner alleged.  In
his Motion for a New Trial, the issue was addressed by prior defense counsel:
What I [defense counsel] can say, in fairness to Larry [Hutchings] is this,
obviously he went to the hospital.  I’m sure there was some conversation about
why he went to the hospital and obviously he would have relayed the information
that he had a back injury.  So in fairness to Larry, that conversation probably took
place but whether or not he told us it was as a result of the date in question, April
6  of 2006, I don’t have any recollection of that and I don’t believe that to be theth
case.  I would say with certainty that Mr. Hutchings never did ask us to talk to his
doctor, he never asked us to get medical records from doctor.  That I can say with
certainty.
R. 269:11-12.
During the Motion for a New Trial, Mr. Hutchings also informed the judge that at
trial, he did not discuss his back injury in front of the jury:
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[Defense counsel]: In your testimony did you reference the injuries that you had
sustained?
Mr. Hutchings: Other than the facial injuries at the time, no sir, I didn’t.
[Defense counsel]: And why not?
Mr. Hutchings: I just – it slipped my memory at that point.
R. 269:6.
After the evidence was presented during the Motion for a New Trial, the trial court
ruled on the back injury issue as follows:
I’ve [the court] listened to the evidence that’s been presented here.  Again, I was
the one that presided over the trial so I’m familiar with the trial and the evidence
that was presented at trial and I’ve read the memorandums.  I’m going to deny the
defendant’s motion.
I’m sorry, Mr. Hutchings, but I’m denying your motion.  I don’t think you’ve met
either prong of the Strickland case and requirements.  I don’t think that you’ve
shown that your counsel’s performance was objectively deficient.  I’ve heard
testimony from counsel that they might have been aware of your back injury but at
no time were they aware that you were seeking to have your doctor questioned by
them nor your medical records to be examined and possibly introduced at the time
of trial.  In fact, I’ve heard your own testimony that during the course of the trial
you spoke about this being basically self-defense against the alleged victim but
even in your testimony you never brought up the fact of the back injury and you
never mentioned it in the course of the trial while on the stand or to your counsels
during the course of the trial and you were obviously aware of your back injury. 
You did claim that you had received certain injuries, I remember that during the
trial from the alleged victim and that did come out to the jury and they still
believed that you were the aggressor and I think that there was enough evidence
for them to be able to do that.
I don’t even think with that I have to get to the second prong but I’m surely not
convinced after having heard all the evidence that even if that came out in trial, it
would have made any difference in the jury’s verdict in regards to this matter.  You
had given testimony that you were injured, maybe not specifically in regards to
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your back but to other injuries and I’m not sure that this would have convinced the
jury to find any differently than they did find.  So for those reasons I’m denying
your motion.
R. 269:16-17.
“[I]t is well settled that, as a general matter, the trial court has broad discretion to
grant or deny a motion for a new trial.  Under this standard of review, we will reverse
only if there is no reasonable basis for the decision.”  State v. Redding, 172 P.3d 319,
2007 UT App 350 (citations omitted).  Given the discretion afforded the trial court for
determining whether to accept or reject Mr. Hutchings testimony over his counsel’s
testimony, “no reasonable basis” exists in the record for a reversal on this issue.  The
lower court acted within its discretion in finding that at “no time were they [counsel]
aware that you were seeking to have your doctor questioned by them nor your medical
records to be examined and possibly introduced at the time of trial.”  R. 269: 16-17.  The
allegations do not meet the requirements of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. 
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).   
E. IN THE EVENT THIS COURT FINDS REVERSIBLE ERROR, DOES
THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY CLAUSE PREVENT A RE-TRIAL OR RE-
SENTENCING?
According to Mr. Hutchings, the Double Jeopardy clause prevents this Court from
remanding his case for re-trial or re-sentencing on a lessor included charge not included
in the jury instructions.  The issue is premature at this point of the briefing schedule, but
the following principles are noted.  
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[T]he double jeopardy guarantee contained in [the state and federal constitution]
protects a defendant from (1) a second prosecution for the same offense after
acquittal, (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3)
multiple punishments for the same offense.
The double jeopardy guarantee does not protect a defendant from a retrial for an
offense when his conviction for that same offense has been reversed on appeal as a
result of trial error.  A caveat to this general rule is that when the conviction of a
lesser offense implies an acquittal of a greater offense, double jeopardy bars retrial
of the greater offense if the conviction for the lesser offense is reversed on appeal.
State v. Low, 192 P.3d 867, 2008 UT 58 ¶¶ 51-52 (citations omitted).  Depending on how
the appeal is resolved, the above authority may or may not be applied to the circumstances
of this case.    
F. ANDERS CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Clayton, 639
P.2d 168 (Utah 1981), appellate counsel seeks permission from this Court to withdraw
from the appeal.  Counsel hand-delivered a copy of the draft for the brief to Mr.
Hutchings for his review.  In response, Mr. Hutchings penned a response to the draft.  Mr.
Hutching’s initial arguments on appeal, as well as his response to the draft of the brief are
attached in Addendum A and Addendum B.  On two occasions, counsel discussed the
substantive arguments of the drafted brief with Mr. Hutchings.  
Although the brief represents a hybrid presentation of the respective positions of
both appellate counsel and Mr. Hutchings, should Mr. Hutchings prevail in his appeal,
trial counsel would be appointed to represent him during the lower court proceedings. 
Should Mr. Hutchings not prevail in his appeal, Mr. Hutchings’ right to appellate counsel
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would not extend beyond his direct appeal (i.e not for a petition for certiorari, nor for
subsequent habeas corpus proceedings).  Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 (1974). 
POINT II.  THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS ELEMENT INSTRUCTION
ON AGGRAVATED ASSAULT TO THE JURY
The jury instruction on Aggravated Assault, Instruction 14, improperly set forth
the mental state as either intentionally or knowingly.  The elements portion of the jury
instruction read:
1. That on or about April 6, 2006, in Salt Lake County, Utah, the defendant,
LARRY HUTCHINGS;
2. Intentionally or knowingly;
3. Committed an assault on Deborah Cuddeback; and
4. Intentionally caused serious bodily injury to her.
R 186 (Jury Instruction 14 is attached as Addendum D).
By allowing the jury to convict Mr. Hutchings under the lesser mental state of
“knowingly,” as opposed to the more culpable mental state of “intentionally,” the
instruction disregarded the elements from the applicable aggravated assault statute.  See
State v. Harmon, 712 P.2d 291 n.2 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (citations omitted) (“failure
to instruct on the elements of the crime is reversible error.”).  The aggravated assault
statute reads in pertinent part:
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-102 and he: 
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(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (1)(a), uses a
dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601or other means or force likely
to produce death or serious bodily injury.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1) (emphasis added).
The State’s theory of aggravated assault, which was reflected in jury instruction
14, focused only on subsection 76-5-103(1)(a).  See Addendum D.  The intentional
mental state is clearly and unequivocally required under subsection 103(1)(a).
The inapplicable section, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(b), was not part of jury
instruction 14.  See Addendum D.  Admittedly, subsection (1)(b) does not require the
intentional mental state, but since subsection (1)(b) was not part of the jury’s
deliberations, the lesser mental states of knowingly or recklessly were inapplicable for
Mr. Hutchings’ trial.  See State v. McElhaney, 579 P.2d 328 (Utah 1978) (footnote
omitted) (“Under 76-5-103(1)(a) the prosecution must prove the defendant intentionally
caused serious bodily injury to another, but under 76-5-103(1)(b) no culpable mental state
is specified and thus under 76-2-102 "intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to
establish criminal responsibility"). 
In the case at bar, trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he failed to
fully and appropriately object to instruction 14.  Granted, counsel partially requested the
insertion of the word, “intentional,” into the accompanying assault instruction, R 271:152,
but such a request did not correct the otherwise improperly inserted “knowingly” mental
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state for the aggravated assault jury instruction.  State v. Haston, 846 P.2d 1276, 1277
(Utah 1993) (per curiam) (“Since the jury was allowed to consider the depraved
indifference alternative, as well as those states of mind described in subsections (a) and
(b) of section 76-5-203(1), defendant is entitled to a new trial.”); see Francis v. Franklin,
471 U.S. 307, 322 (1985) ("Nothing in these specific sentences or in the charge as a
whole makes clear to the jury that one of these contradictory instructions carries more
weight than the other.  Language that merely contradicts and does not explain a
constitutionally infirm instruction will not suffice to absolve the infirmity.  A reviewing
court has no way of knowing which of the two irreconcilable instructions the jurors
applied in reaching their verdict.").  Prior counsel’s inactions constituted deficient
performance and it was unreasonable for counsel to act in a manner contrary to the
language in the Aggravated Assault statute.  Absent the error, the outcome would have
been different.  
Moreover, the trial court committed plain error in allowing the jury instruction on 
Aggravated Assault to be in clear violation of the plain language of the corresponding
statute.  Compare Addendum D with Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(1)(a).  Allowing the
jury to consider a lesser mental state as a basis for a conviction is plain error.  The error
should have been obvious to the trial court because of the statutory language.  And the
error was harmful because this Court is unable to determine if the jury improperly relied
on the lesser mental state during its deliberations.  A new trial is required.
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POSITION ON ORAL ARGUMENT
Oral argument is not requested. 
CONCLUSION
Defendant/Appellant, Larry Lewis Hutchings, respectfully requests that this Court
reverse his conviction and remand his case for a new trial.
SUBMITTED this 18  day of June, 2009.th
/s/ Ronald S. Fujino          
Ronald S. Fujino
Attorney for Mr. Hutchings
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I have caused the original and seven copies of the foregoing to
be hand-delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State, 5th Floor, P. O. Box
140230, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and two copies to the Utah Attorney General's
Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, 6th Floor, P. O. Box 140854, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84114-0854, this 18  day of June, 2009.th
/s/ Vanessa Coleman                
ADDENDUM A
State of Utah v. Larry Lewis Hutchings, "Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend
Appellant's Brief," page 2, dated January 21, 2009 (“Hutchings’ Issues”)
ADDENDUM B
State of Utah v. Larry Lewis Hutchings, 
Mr. Hutchings’ Supplemental Response to the Anders Brief
ADDENDUM C
Statutes, Rules and Constitutional Provisions
ADDENDUM D
Jury Instruction 14; Aggravated Assault Instruction









































